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In the course of abdominal surgery at Passaic General Hospital
on October 26, 1970, a Penrose drain was inserted into the incision of
the patient, Hazel Mae Fox.' Thereafter, although attending nurses
noticed that the drain was missing, the patient was nevertheless discharged. 2 Continuing abdominal pain necessitated her subsequent
readmission for additional surgery on November 17, 1970, during
which a similar drain was inserted. 3 On February 22, 1971, after continuing pain and further medical treatment, the original drain was
4
discovered in Ms. Fox's abdomen.
Ms. Fox filed suit on March 31, 1971, in Superior Court, Law
Division, against the surgeon who performed the original operation,
alleging negligent medical treatment. 5 After settling this claim, the
1 See Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 135 N.J. Super. 108, 109, 342 A.2d 859, 860 (App.
Div. 1975), aff'd, 71 N.J. 122, 363 A.2d 341 (1976); Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 2, Fox
v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 135 N.J. Super. 108, 342 A.2d 859 (App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 71 N.J.
122, 363 A.2d 341 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant]. A Penrose
drain is a cigarette-shaped instrument "composed of rubber tubing containing a length
of absorbant gauze." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 481 (21st ed. 1966). Such a
drain was inserted into Ms. Fox, Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra at 2, to eliminate the
collection of fluid in the body cavity subsequent to surgery, STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DIcTIONARY, supra at 481.
2 Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 135 N.J. Super. 108, 109, 342 A.2d 859, 860 (App. Div.
1975), aff'd, 71 N.J. 122, 363 A.2d 341 (1976). In the appellate division opinion, the
time sequence was referred to as "on or about October 30, 1970." 135 N.J. Super. at
109, 342 A.2d at 860.
3 Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 135 N.J. Super. 108, 109-10, 342 A.2d 859, 860 (App.
Div. 1975), aff'd, 71 N.J. 122, 363 A.2d 341 (1976).
4 See Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 135 N.J. Super. 108, 110, 342 A.2d 859, 860-61
(App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 71 N.J. 122, 363 A.2d 341 (1976). X-rays taken on February 22,
1971, at another hospital revealed the presence of a foreign object in the plaintiff's
abdomen. Upon removal, this object was ascertained to be the original drain. 135 N.J.
Super. at 109-10, 342 A.2d at 860.
5 Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 135 N.J. Super. 108, 110, 342 A.2d 859, 861 (App. Div.
1975), aff'd, 71 N.J. 122, 363 A.2d 341 (1976); Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 1,
at 1-2.
As a preliminary method of screening claims involving medical malpractice, New
Jersey provides an informal, voluntary procedure for the evaluation of such claims. See
N.J.R. 4:21-1 to -10. In effectuating the stated purposes of discouraging baseless claims
and providing easy access to expert witnesses, a confidential hearing, without strict
evidentiary rules, is provided before a subpanel consisting of two doctors, two lawyers
and a former judge. See, e.g., Marsello v. Barnett, 50 N.J. 577, 584, 236 A.2d 869, 873
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plaintiff filed suit on December 1, 1972, in the same court against
both Passaic General Hospital and an attending nurse, alleging negligent postoperative treatment in connection with the original operation. 6 The defendants then moved for summary judgment on the basis
of the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations applicable to
personal injuries. 7 Dismissing the plaintiff's argument that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the actual or constructive
discovery of the foreign object, the trial judge granted the motion. 8
Subsequently, the appellate division held that the defendant's
motion should not have been granted, reasoning that the plaintiff
could not reasonably have known of the existence of her claim prior
to February 22, 1971. 9 Based upon this determination, the court con(1967). For a more detailed evaluation of these procedures, see Karcher, Malpractice
Claims Against Doctors: New Jersey's Screening Procedure, 53 A.B.A.J. 328 (1967);
Professional Liability Claims Against Members of the Medical Profession, NJ. Court
Rule 4:25B, 91 N.J.L.J. 589 (1968).
6 Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 135 N.J. Super. 108, 110, 342 A.2d 859, 861 (App. Div.
1975), aff'd, 71 N.J. 122, 363 A.2d 341 (1976). Under New Jersey law, the negligent tort
liability of a non-profit hospital is limited by statute to $10,000. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:53A-8 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-1977). However, this statutory limitation of liability
is not applicable to a hospital which is operated by a municipality. See, e.g., Winters v.
City of Jersey City, 63 N.J. 7, 8, 304 A.2d 196, 196 (1973), modifying per curiam 120 N.J.
Super. 129, 293 A.2d 431 (App. Div. 1972).
Although originally only the hospital and one nurse were named as defendants in
the complaint, it was amended upon Ms. Fox's discovery of the identity of another nurse
involved in her treatment. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 1, at 6.
7 Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 135 N.J. Super. 108, 110-11, 342 A.2d 859, 861 (App.
Div. 1975), aff'd, 71 N.J. 122, 363 A.2d 341 (1976). The applicable statute of limitations
for personal injuries in New Jersey provides as follows:
Every action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act,
neglect or default of any person within this state shall be commenced within 2
years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 1952).
8 See Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 71 N.J. 122, 125, 363 A.2d 341, 342 (1976). In evaluating the claim of the plaintiff, the trial judge had noted that in certain circumstances
the substitution of another schedule for the expeditious commencement of the action
was permissible. See id. at 131, 363 A.2d at 346 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Considering
those facts within the plaintiff's knowledge, however, the trial judge could find no justification for delaying the running of the statute of limitations. See Fox v. Passaic Gen.
Hosp., 135 N.J. Super. 108, 111, 342 A.2d 859, 861 (App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 71 N.J. 122,
363 A.2d 341 (1976); Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 1, at 7. Thus, it was concluded that the plaintiff should not benefit by the belated discovery of her claim since
she had been dilatory in failing to pursue the claim for an extended period of time. See 71
N.J. at 125, 363 A.2d at 342.
9 Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 135 N.J. Super. 108, 111, 342 A.2d 859, 861 (App. Div.
1975), aff'd, 71 N.J. 122, 363 A.2d 341 (1976). The court further noted that the twentyfive month delay between the time at which the drain was first missed and the institution of suit did not create the danger of a "false, frivolous, speculative or uncertain
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cluded that the plaintiff had filed suit within two years of "discovery"
and, therefore, was equitably entitled to toll the statute of limitations
until that date. 10 The dissenting opinion in the appellate division, however, contended that the nineteen-month delay between plaintiff's
discovery of the claim and the date on which she filed suit, together
with the absence of the factors which normally necessitate the invocation of such an equitable doctrine, rendered the application of the
discovery rule inappropriate."
Following the defendant's appeal, 12 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, in Fox v. Passaic General Hospital,'3 held that the discovery
rule permitted a claimant, as a general rule, a "full . . . two years" in
which to file suit from the time of actual or constructive discovery of
the cause of action. 14 In affirming the lower court's holding, the majority found itself "in essential agreement with . . . the Appellate
Division."' i s The court reached this result by relying upon considerations of simplicity and justice for all parties, together with "the legislative policy determination that" a claimant is permitted to file suit

claim," nor was the plaintiff's credibility in question. 135 N.J. Super. at 112, 342 A.2d
at 861.
10 Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 135 N.J. Super. 108, 112-13, 342 A.2d 859, 862, aff'd,
71 N.J. 122, 363 A.2d 341 (1976). In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon the
decision in Yerzy v. Levine, 57 N.J. 234, 271 A.2d 425, aff'g per curiam as modified
108 N.J. Super. 222, 260 A.2d 533 (App. Div. 1970). For a more detailed discussion of
this case, see notes 58-59 infra and accompanying text.
1 Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 135 N.J. Super. 108, 113-15, 342 A.2d 859, 862-63
(App. Div. 1975) (Morgan, J., dissenting), aff'd, 71 N.J. 122, 363 A.2d 341 (1976). Judge
Morgan contended that the majority had implicitly created an automatic rule extending
the period of the statute of limitations "for two years following . . . discovery" of the
cause of action. 135 N.J. Super. at 113, 342 A.2d at 862. In her view, this result was not
consonant with the factor which had created the necessity for the discovery rule-the
"grotesque result" of a claimant being barred from suit prior to knowing of the existence of a claim. Id. at 114-15, 342 A.2d at 863. Relying upon the concurring opinion of
Judge Gaulkin in Rothman v. Silber, 90 N.J. Super. 22, 36-38, 216 A.2d 18, 26 (App.
Div.), cert. denied, 46 N.J. 538, 218 A.2d 405 (1966), Judge Morgan favored the alternative of allowing a claimant a "reasonable time" to institute an action following discovery. 135 N.J. Super. at 115-17, 342 A.2d at 863-64.
12 See Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 71 N.J. 122, 124, 363 A.2d 341, 342 (1976). Pursuant to N.J.R. 2:2-1(a)(2), an appeal may be taken as a matter of right to the supreme
court when a dissent has been filed to a final judgment in the appellate division. Cf. State
v. Smith, 59 N.J. 297, 299, 282 A.2d 33, 34 (1971) (dissent in the appellate division as to
whether to reopen a case to a point not previously litigated does not grant an appeal as
of right).
13 71 N.J. 122, 362 A.2d 341 (1976), aff'g 135 N.J. Super. 108, 342 A.2d 859 (App.
Div. 1975).
14 71 N.J. at 126, 363 A.2d at 343.
15 Id. at 125, 363 A.2d at 342.
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within two years of accrual of the cause of action.1 6 The court placed
the burden of showing the prejudicial effect of such an application
upon the defendant. 17 In contrast, the dissenting opinion argued that
by applying the discovery rule in such an automatic manner, "judicial
efficiency" is achieved at the expense of discouraging the diligent
8
pursuit of a litigant's claim.'
In view of the interpretation of the applicable statute of limitations adopted by the Fox majority, it is appropriate to examine both
the purposes and the effect of such enactments.' 9 Traditionally, a
statute of limitations operates to bar the invocation of a court's power
to give legal redress to a claimant if a cause of action is instituted
after the expiration of the prescribed time period.2 0 Underlying such
a seemingly arbitrary application are the countervailing policy considerations of the unfairness to potential defendants, in the sense that
the passage of time creates evidentiary difficulties in connection with
the presentation of a defense, 2 1 together with the notion that a court
should not be burdened with litigating "stale claims."22
16Id. at 126, 363 A.2d at 343.
17 Id. at 128, 363 A.2d at 344. For an examination of the prejudice rule announced by

the court, see notes 76-77 infra and accompanying text.
18 71 N.J. at 128-29, 131-32, 363 A.2d at 344, 346 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
19At common law, one of the earliest statutes of limitations relating to personal
actions was the Limitation Act of 1623. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1178 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. Essentially, this statute prescribed varying time periods for different actions, including those
actions which may be currently categorized as personal injury. Id. at 1178, 1192 n.148.
The inferred purpose of the enactment was to prevent the litigation of inconsequential
claims in the king's courts and, incidentally, to provide some protection for poor defendants. Id. at 1178. Generally, in contemporary jurisprudence, these legislative enactments are considered "practical and pragmatic devices" reflective of a "public policy
[regarding] the privilege to litigate." Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314
(1945). Such statutes have, in one form or another, been adopted by every state. See
Developments, supra at 1179. For an example of the variety of time limits and actions
governed by statutes of limitations, see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:14-1 to -20 (West
1952 & Cum. Supp. 1976-1977).
20 Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 313 (1945). See also Developinents,
supra note 19, at 1185. An alternative means of conceptualizing the effect of limitations
statutes is that such enactments operate to "extinguis[h] the claim and destro[y] the right
itself." 325 U.S. at 313.
21See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965). Fundamentally, these enactments reflect the view that a person should be spared from defending
against a claim after "evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared." Order of R.R. Tel'rs v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944). Thus, in theory, no distinction is made "between

. . . just and . . . unjust

claim[s]," Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, because, regardless of the
quality of one's claim, it is manifestly unjust to fail to give the opposing party "notice to
defend within the period of limitation." 321 U.S. at 349.
22 Order of R.R. Tel'rs v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944); see
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In New Jersey, the statute of limitations for personal injuries is
two years, dating from the point at which a cause of action accrues. 2 3
In interpreting such statutory language in the context of litigation involving negligent medical treatment, the early cases in New Jersey
held that a cause of action accrued at the moment of the negligent
act. 2 4 Illustrative of the early view is the case of Weinstein v, Blanchard.25 In Weinstein, while operating on the plaintiff, a surgeon inserted two drainage tubes within the incision, one of which apparently slipped into the wound. 2 6 After the plaintiff instituted suit
against the surgeon when X-rays revealed the presence of the foreign
object, the court dismissed the claim on the basis of the expiration of
the two-year statute of limitations. 2 7 The court then stated that any
injury, even though slight, affords a legal remedy and, accordingly,
"'the statute of limitations begins to run from ... the breach of
duty, and not from the time of the discovery.' "28
Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); Chase Sec. Corp. v.
Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
23N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 1952), quoted at note 7 supra.
In certain jurisdictions, statutes of limitations have been enacted which specifically
deal with the question of medical malpractice. In New York, for example, a statute was
recently passed providing for a thirty-month limitation when "there is continuous treatment" for the condition from which the negligent activity arose and, additionally, providing a one-year period to commence an action after actual or constructive discovery of a
foreign object in the body. NEW YORK CIv. PRAc. LAW § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1976).
For a general discussion with critical commentary on the New York statute, see Comment, Medical Malpracticein New York, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 657, 711-17 (1976).
For an analysis of the statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice in the
various states, see Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and
Other Jurisdictions,47 CORNELL L.Q. 339, 357-60 (1962).
24 See, eg., Weinstein v. Blanchard, 109 N.J.L. 332, 336, 162 A. 601, 602-03 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1932).
25 109 N.J.L. 332, 162 A. 601 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932).
26 Id. at 334, 162 A. at 602.
27Id. at 334-35, 162 A. at 602.
28 Id. at 336, 162 A. at 602-03 (emphasis deleted) (quoting from Gogolin v. Williams, 91 N.J.L. 266, 267, 102 A. 667, 668 (Ct. Err. & App. 1917)). The Weinstein court
interpreted "accrual of [a] cause of action" to mean "the right to institute and maintain
a [law] suit." 109 N.J.L. at 336, 162 A. at 602 (relying upon Larason v. Lambert, 12
N.J.L. 247, 248 (Sup. Ct. 1831)). Reasoning that even nominal damage arising from a
negligently inflicted injury conferred the right to institute suit, the court held that the
statute of limitations commenced running at the moment of the plaintiff's operation in
1909, rather than when the object was discovered in 1928. 109 N.J.L. at 336-38, 162 A.
at 602-03. The court relied primarily upon Gogolin v.Williams in reaching this conclusion. See id. at 336, 162 A. at 602-03. Gogolin involved the negligent preparation of a
survey and map by a surveyor. 91 N.J.L. at 266, 102 A. at 667. As a result of the discovery of the surveyor's error eight years later, the plaintiffs were forced to purchase land
owned by another and upon which they had built a house. Id. The Gogolin court held,
however, that the statute of limitations began to run at the time the service was performed
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The principles articulated by the Weinstein court concerning the
accrual of a cause of action were subsequently reaffirmed in Tortorello
v. Reinfeld. 2 9 In reaching the conclusion that the statutory period
commenced from the time of injury "irrespective of the time when
the injury is discovered," 30 the Tortorello court construed the statutory language to mean that -[a]ny wrongful act or omission resulting
31
in any injury . .. though slight," confers the right to institute suit.
While it was recognized that individual hardships would result from
this construction, the Tortorello court contended that to hold otherwise " 'would be inimical to the repose of society and promote litigation .. .too uncertain and too speculative to be encouraged.' "32
The view developed, however, that barring a plaintiff prior to his
knowledge of the existence of a claim was neither consonant with the
policy considerations underlying the statute of limitations, 3 3 nor was it
justified by reference to the legislative intent of such enactments. 34 In
negligently, rather than the date on which the damage was subsequently discovered.
Id. at 267, 102 A. at 668.
Later cases in non-medical malpractice contexts adopted this view approvingly. See,
e.g., Sullivan v. Stout, 120 N.J.L. 304, 309-10, 199 A. 1, 4 (Ct. Err. & App. 1938) (running of
statute not delayed, absent a showing of fraud, by a belated discovery of an attorney's
negligent performance of a title search). See also Martucci v. Koppers Co., 58 F. Supp.
707, 708 (D.N.J. 1945).
29 6 N.J. 58, 77 A.2d 240 (1950).
30Id. at 65, 77 A.2d at 243. In Tortorello, the plaintiff had instituted suit against a
surgeon, alleging the negligent performance of plastic surgery. Id. at 60, 77 A.2d at 241.
Notwithstanding the fact that the resultant damage did not manifest itself until after the
operation, the court utilized this interpretation of accrual of a cause of action to bar the
plaintiff's claim. Id. at 65, 77 A.2d at 243.
31 Id. at 65, 77 A.2d at 243. Despite this interpretation, the Tortorello court specified
two narrow exceptions to the principle that the statute of limitations in a personal injury case begins to run at the moment of the injury's occurrence. First, if the treating
'physician . . . has been guilty of fraudulent concealment," the commencement of the
statute of limitations may be delayed. Id. at 66, 77 A.2d at 244. Secondly, the court
would allow the plaintiff to delay the running of the statute of limitations until the termination of treatment if the damages had resulted "from a continuing course of negligent treatment." Id. (emphasis in original). For an explanation of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, see note 35 infra. For an explanation of the continuous course of
treatment doctrine, see id.
32 6 N.J. at 67, 77 A.2d at 244 (quoting from Gangloff v. Apfelbach, 319 Il. App.
596, 606, 49 N.E.2d 795, 799 (1943)).
" See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949) (barring claim of plaintiff
relating to illness contracted over thirty-year period found inconsistent with the traditional purposes of statute of limitations).
34 Illustrative of this position is Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238
A.2d 169 (1968). In Rosenau, the court contended that a construction of the statute barring a plaintiff before an opportunity existed to initiate legal proceedings "offendfed]
common sense and justice." Id. at 140, 238 A.2d at 174. It was concluded, therefore, that
"such [an] incongruous result" could not have been within the legislative intent. ld.;
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order to circumvent the strict application of the statute of limitations
in this context, courts in various jurisdictions created several artificial
35
approaches which have been characterized as "transparent devices."see also Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 284, 154 A.2d 788, 789 (1959) (judicial application of statute of limitations should not create results that could not have been intended
by the legislature).
35 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 144 (4th ed. 1971); see
also 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 341, 343-44 (1967). These devices include the doctrine of continuous treatment, fraudulent concealment of injury, " 'constructive' fraud" in the physician's silence and the concept of " 'continuing' negligence." W. PROSSER, su pra at 144.
The doctrine of continuous treatment provides that where an act of malpractice is
alleged to have occurred "during a . . . substantially uninterrupted course of treatment
for a particular ... condition" the statute of limitations is tolled until the treatment has
been terminated. Samuelson v. Freeman, 75 Wash. 2d 894, 900, 454 P.2d 406, 410
(1969). In justifying the doctrine, reliance is generally placed upon its tendency to solidify the relationship between physician and patient. Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St. 2d 164,
167-68, 267 N.E.2d 419, 421 (1971). For examples of the application of this doctrine, see
Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 155, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321, 187 N.E.2d
777, 778 (1962) (if treatment included wrongful acts in question and is related to original condition, cause of action for medical malpractice does not accrue until course of
treatment ends); Fonda v. Paulsen, 46 App. Div. 2d 540, 544-45, 363 N.Y.S.2d 841,
844-45 (1975) (continuous course of treatment doctrine applicable despite significant
lapses of time between treatments related to cancerous condition).
Under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, the statute of limitations does not
run until the plaintiff learns or should have learned of the fact concealed by the defendant. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Virusky, 306 F. Snpp. 519, 521 (S.D. Ga. 1969), rev'd on other
grounds and remanded, 470 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1972). For application of the doctrine,
see Ray v. Scheibert, 224 Tenn. 99, 104-05, 450 S.W.2d 578, 580-81 (1969) (doctor's
misrepresentation of the cause of plaintiff's paralysis constituted fraudulent concealment delaying the running of the statute of limitations); Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J. Super.
225, 232, 164 A.2d 357, 361 (App. Div. 1960) (concealment by physician of failure to
remove entire foetus during therapeutic abortion delayed the running of the statute of
limitations until the fraud was actually discovered).
In view of the fiduciary relationship between a doctor and patient, the physician
can be charged with constructive fraud based upon knowledge of the facts or the injury
and the failure to disclose same, even absent an intent to deceive, thus tolling the statute
of limitations until discovery of the cause of the injury by the plaintiff. Morrison v.
Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 35-36, 198 P.2d 590, 595-96 (1948); see, e.g., Kauchick v. Williams,
435 S.W.2d 342, 349 (Mo. 1968) (circumstances not available to infer that defendant
knew of facts which, if concealed by silence, would constitute fraud). The approach in
certain jurisdictions, however, has been to require an affirmative act of concealment.
See, e.g., Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794, 798 (Del. 1968) (knowledge and affirmative
action are essential elements of fraudulent concealment in a malpractice case).
One of the earliest applications of the doctrine of continuous negligence was Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902). In Gillette, a surgeon negligently
left a sponge in the plaintiff's abdomen following surgery. Id. at 108, 65 N.E. at 866.
The court noted that "the . . . duty . . . to remove the sponge" was "a continu[ing]

obligation," the neglect of which constituted "a continuous . . . breach" more serious
than the original negligence in leaving the sponge in the body. Id. at 126-27, 65 N.E.
at 870. See also Frazor v. Osborne, 57 Tenn. App. 10, 12, 18-20, 414 S.W.2d 118, 119,
122-23 (1966) (the presence of a sponge negligently left in plaintiff's body constituted
continuing negligence on the part of the physician until termination of treatment).
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The discovery rule-providing that a cause of action does not accrue
36
until a party discovers or should have discovered the basis of a claim
-is the most direct approach.3 7 This doctrine emanates from the
equitable consideration that an individual should not "be denied his
38
day in court" due to blameless ignorance.
Cognizant of both the principles underlying the statute of limitations as well as the policy considerations upon which the discovery
rule was formulated, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Fernandi
40
v. Struly 3 9 expressly adopted the discovery rule for the first time.
In Fernatidi, a foreign object was left in the plaintiff's abdomen follow41
ing surgery and was not discovered until three years thereafter.
Based upon the Weinstein precedent, the trial court dismissed the
plaintiff's suit against the operating physician. 42 On appeal to the

supreme court, Justice Jacobs, writing for the majority, held that
fairness and justice mandated that the statute of limitations should not
commence running until the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of
the presence of the negligently left foreign object in the body. 43 The
court specifically limited the applicability of the discovery rule to a
narrowly defined " 'class of cases' " involving the presence of a
foreign

object, 4 4 outside

of which

the principles

in Tortorello

36 Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 272, 300 A.2d 563, 565 (1973). For a general discussion of the discovery rule, see Lillich, supra note 23, at 357-60; Comment, Malpractice
Statute of Limitations in New York: Conflict and Confusion, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 276,
286-92 (1973); 55 IOwA L. REV. 486,488-90 (1969); 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 341,346-49 (1967).
37 See W. PROSSER, supra note 35, § 30, at 144. For a listing of the jurisdictions adopting the discovery rule, see Comment, supra note 36, at 292-94.
38 Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 273-74, 300 A.2d 563, 566 (1973).
39 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961).
40 Id. at 450-51, 173 A.2d at 286.
41 Id. at 435-36, 173 A.2d at 278. The foreign object was a wing nut from a retractor
used during the course of a hysterectomy performed on Mrs. Fernandi. Id. at 436, 172
A.2d at 278.
42Id. at 437, 173 A.2d at 278-79. Although the trial judge indicated that a contrary
result was more appropriate, he ruled that, upon the authority of the Weinstein and
Tortorello cases, the claim was barred since it had been filed more than two years after
the operation had been performed. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the Weinstein
and Tortorello cases, see notes 2.5-33 supra and accompanying text.
43 35 N.J. at 450, 173 A.2d at 286.
44 Id. (quoting from 1 WOOD ON LIMITATIONS § 122a, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1916)). In
the court's analysis, the presence of a foreign object created "a special grouping or 'class
of cases' " which delayed the running of the statute of limitations until the object was
discovered. 35 N.J. at 450, 173 A.2d at 286 (quoting from I WOOD, supra, § 122a, at
685-86). The court added that "[i]f ... the resulting jeopardy to defendants produces a
greater measure of care in connection with surgical operations, so much the better." 35
N.J. at 451, 173 A.2d at 286. Accordingly, the holding specifically overruled the contrary
decision of the Weinstein court. Id. at 450, 173 A.2d at 286.
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concerning the accrual of a cause of action still governed. 4 5 The court
was careful to note that the circumstances surrounding the case did
not suggest either a false or frivolous claim or the failure to pursue
the claim diligently. 46 On the contrary, the court suggested that Mrs.
Fernandi's actions suggested the prompt enforcement of her legal
rights rather than any dilatoriness on her part. 47 More importantly, in
the court's view, this combination of circumstances eliminated the
possibility that, by granting this exception, the statutory policy would
48
be undermined.
In Rothman v. Silber,4 9 the importance of the expeditious pursuit of a claim in a discovery case was further emphasized in a concurring opinion. 50 Although the majority based its refusal to apply the
discovery rule on the classification of anaesthesia as a non-foreign
object, 51 different considerations prompted Judge Gaulkin's concur45 New Mkt. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419, 424, 241 A.2d 633, 636
(1968). The court noted that the effect of the Fernandi decision was to abrogate, within
the confines of the factual setting presented, "the general rule that the statute runs from
the date of ... infliction of the ... injury." Id.
46 35 N.J. at 450-51, 173 A.2d at 286. It was noted that since the doctor's professional discretion was not in question and the plaintiff's credibility was not disputed, the
lapse of time did not create questions as to the legitimacy of the claim. Id.
47 Id. at 451, 173 A.2d at 286. Indeed, Justice Jacobs noted that the circumstances,
rather than suggesting dilatoriness, established that the existence of a claim was "unknown and unknowable to her" until a short time before initiating the action. Id.
48 Id.
In creating a narrow exception based on the presence of a foreign object, the
court reasoned that the policies underlying the statute of limitations would not be
"undu[ly] impair[ed]." Id.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Hall contended that, despite the fact that "[olne's
sympathies naturally run with the plaintiff" and even though the "plaintiff's essential
evidence to establish a cause of action may . . . be preserved indefinitely . . . by the
foreign object's remaining in her body," the defendant's case may nevertheless be damaged by the loss of important evidence due to the passage of time. Id. More importantly,
however, the dissent maintains that any evaluation of these competing interests is a
policy decision better left to legislative determination. Id. at 452, 173 A.2d at 287.
49 90 N.J. Super. 22, 216 A.2d 18 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 46 N.J. 538, 218 A.2d 405
(1966), noted in 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 778 (1967).
50 90 N.J. Super. at 36, 216 A.2d at 26 (Gaulkin, J., concurring).
51 Id. at 29-31, 216 A.2d at 21-22. The trial judge ruled that the classification of
anaesthesia as a foreign object was not "inconsistent with . . . the Fernandi case."
Rothman v. Silber, 83 N.J. Super. 192, 203, 199 A.2d 86, 92 (Law Div. 1964) (emphasis in original), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 90 N.J. Super. 22, 216 A.2d 18 (App. Div.),
cert. denied, 46 N.J. 538, 218 A.2d 405 (1966). However, the appellate division found
several distinguishable characteristics between anaesthesia and foreign objects. 90
N.J. Super. at 29-31, 216 A.2d at 21-23. It was noted that, unlike a foreign object, the
anaesthesia was intentionally injected into the body, and moreover, although a foreign
object generally retains its physical characteristics, anaesthesia "loses its identity
quickly" once injected into the body. Id. at 30-31, 216 A.2d at 22. Additionally, although the presence of a foreign object may in itself be indicative of negligence, a
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rence. 5 2 Emphasizing the failure of the plaintiff to institute suit within
two years of the act despite the fact that sixteen months remained
between discovery of the claim and the expiration of the two-year
period, it was argued that the claim should have been barred even if
a foreign object was involved. 5 3 Because the discovery rule under
Fernandi did not establish "an iron-clad mechanical rule," but rather
was developed to avoid injustice in particular cases, Judge Gaulkin
considered it crucial to evaluate the plaintiff's diligent enforcement of
her rights. 54 Judge Gaulkin concluded from this reasoning that, considering the plaintiff's delay in pursuing her claim, interests of justice
did not require that an exception to the enforcement of the statute of

55
limitations be made under the discovery rule.
Subsequent to Rothman, however, wider acceptance for the
principles of the discovery rule became apparent, resulting in an extension of this doctrine to several contexts unrelated to the problems
of medical malpractice. 5 6 Combining the trend towards the extension
of the doctrine with the original rationale of the discovery rule, courts
subsequently applied these principles outside of the narrow confines
established by Fernandi in the medical malpractice context. 5 7 How-

recovery based on the negligent adminstration of a drug must be based on lack of due
skill and care, proof of which requires expert testimony. Id. at 31, 216 A.2d at 292-23.
Thus, plaintiff's credibility becomes an issue and the danger exists of a frivolous or
speculative claim. Id., 216 A.2d at 23. Further, since the plaintiff knew of the basis of
her suit 18 months prior to instituting the action, the court concluded that the plaintiff
had in fact slept on her rights. Id.
52 90 N.J. Super. at 36-38, 216 A.2d at 26.
53 Id. at 22, 36-37, 216 A.2d at 26. Judge Gaulkin found no circumstances, such as
the defendant influencing the plaintiff to deter commencement of her suit, which would
justify the extended delay. Id.
54 Id. at 37-38, 216 A.2d at 26. The decision in Fernandi was analyzed as an exception to the strict application of the statute of limitations based on the "special circumstances" presented in that case. Id. at 37, 216 A.2d at 26. Since the Fernandi court had
found the expeditious pursuit of a claim on the part of the plaintiff to be necessary
when discovery was more than two years from the act, it was concluded that the same
standard should apply if discovery occurs before the expiration of the statutory period.
Id. at 37-38, 216 A.2d at 26.
5 Id. at 38, 216 A.2d at 26.
56
See, e.g., Diamond v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 51 N.J. 594, 596-97, 242 A.2d
622, 623 (1968) (discovery rule applicable to negligent installation of an underground
conduit causing flooding of plaintiffs property); New Mkt. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419, 420, 425, 241 A.2d 633, 636-37 (1968) (discovery rule applicable to
negligently prepared survey discovered eleven years after the act); Rosenau v. City of
New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 134, 139-40, 238 A.2d 169, 171, 173-74 (1968) (cause of
action accrued against water meter manufacturer when defect was discovered despite 22
year lapse between purchase and the time of the damage).
57 E.g., Yerzy v. Levine, 108 N.J. Super. 222, 260 A.2d 533 (App. Div.), aff'd per
curiam as modified, 57 N.J. 234, 271 A.2d 425 (1970). In Yerzy, the appellate division
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ever, those questions related to the expeditious pursuit of a claim and
the allowable length of time for a discovery plaintiff to institute suit
were not discussed until the supreme court's affirmance in Yerzy v.
Levine. 5 8 While limiting the holding to the particular facts involved,
the court in Yerzy held that the statute of limitations question was to
be determined on the basis of whether the claim was instituted
59
within two years of the time of discovery.
Since the Yerzy decision did not reach the issues of the criteria
and procedural methods of applying the discovery rule, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey subsequently attempted to clarify this area. In
Lopez v. Swtyer, 6 ° the plaintiff instituted suit against her radiologist
nearly six years after the termination of treatment, alleging that the
negligent administration of the radiation therapy resulted in severe
and prolonged medical complications. 6 1 Justice Mountain, writing for
a unanimous court, noted that the discovery rule is applicable not
only to situations in which a claimant is unaware of the existence of
utilized this rationale in applying the discovery rule to the negligent performance of
internal surgery where no foreign object was involved. 108 N.J. Super. at 223-24, 260
A.2d at 533-34. The court reached the conclusion that this was an appropriate factual
situation for applying this doctrine by reviewing both the Fernandi case and the recent
New Market, Rosenau and Diamond decisions, arguing that the emerging judicial view
favored extending the discovery rule to " 'other situations [that] may well be appropriate.' " Id. at 227-29, 260 A.2d at 536-37 (quoting from Diamond v. New Jersey
Bell Tel. Co., 51 N.J. 594, 597, 242 A.2d 622, 623 (1968)). Further, in view of the undisputed nature of the injury, the lapse of time did not create the danger of a frivolous
claim nor did the circumstances suggest a lack of diligence in the plaintiff's pursuit of
the claim. 108 N.J. Super. at 229, 260 A.2d at 537.
58 57 N.J. 234, 271 A.2d 425, aff'g per curiam as modified 108 N.J. Super. 222, 260
A.2d 533 (App. Div. 1970).
-957 N.J. at 235, 271 A.2d at 426. Notwithstanding this requirement, the principles
of Tortorello had not been completely discarded. In Rankin v. Sowinski, 119 N.J. Super.
393, 291 A.2d 849 (App. Div. 1972), for example, the plaintiff sued a dentist five years
after the alleged negligent treatment and improper diagnosis relating to the extraction of
a tooth. Id. at 395-96, 291 A.2d at 850. The plaintiff contended that her discovery of the
defendant's negligence had occurred only six months prior to instituting suit and, as
such, the suit was timely filed. Id. at 398, 291 A.2d at 852. The supreme court interpreted both Fernandi and Yerzy as creating only narrowly defined exceptions to the
general rule as stated in Tortorello. Id. at 399, 291 A.2d at 852. Consequently, even a
slight injury, negligently inflicted, created a right to institute suit at the moment the
injury was inflicted, not at the point of discovery. See id. at 400, 291 A.2d at 853. Thus,
since the plaintiff knew of her injury and the identity of the party causing it, the Rankin
court concluded that the claim was barred since the basic policy of repose underlying
the statute of limitations controlled. Id. at 401, 291 A.2d at 853.
60 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973).
61 Id.
at 270-71, 300 A.2d at 565. The plaintiff had undergone a radical mastectomy
and, as a cautionary measure, radiation therapy was prescribed. Lopez v. Swyer, 115
N.J. Super. 237, 242, 279 A.2d 116, 119 (App. Div. 1971), aff'd in part and modified in
part, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973).
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his injury, but also to instances in which he is aware of his injury although unaware of the person to whom the negligence is attributable. 62 In the process of affirming the appellate division, the court
held that, notwithstanding the expiration of the two-year statute of
limitations, there was indeed a material issue of fact under the discovery rule as to whether the plaintiff knew or reasonably might have
been expected to know that the injuries sustained were attributable
63
to the neglect of the defendant.
Significantly, in remanding the case to the trial court to determine the applicability of the discovery rule, the Lopez court set forth
several criteria for determining whether a party is equitably entitled
to the benefit of the doctrine. 6 4 These factors include: "[1] the nature
of the . . . injury, [21 the availability of witnesses and . .. evidence,

[3] the length of time . . .elapsed since the alleged wrongdoing, [4]
whether the delay [was] intentional, [5] whether the delay . . . pe-

culiarly or unusually prejudiced the defendant." 65 In view of the
countervailing considerations of fairness to a defendant, 6 6 the court
6262 N.J. at 274, 300 A.2d at 567. In defining the discovery rule, the Lopez court
considered knowledge of the "basis for an actionable claim" to be a prerequisite to the
running of the statute of limitations. Id. at 272, 300 A.2d at 565. Because the discovery
rule is defined in this manner, knowledge of the injury must necessarily be coupled
with knowledge of the causal relationship between the injury and some negligent act of
the defendant in order for the statute of limitations to commence running. Lopez v.
Swyer, 115 N.J. Super. 237, 246, 279 A.2d 116, 121 (App. Div. 1971), aff'd in part and
modified in part, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973). The appellate division found this
distinction crucial since it was undisputed that the plaintiff knew immediately that she
had been harmed, although the person to whom the injury was attributable was in
doubt. 115 N.J. Super. at 246, 279 A.2d at 121. For a discussion of the reasoning of the
appellate division in Lopez, see Case Comment, Discovery Rule Applied to External Injuries, Fraudulent Concealment and the Treating Physician's Duty to Disclose, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 711 (1971).
Furthermore, in certain situations the discovery rule is applicable even if the only
unknown factor is the name of the defendant. See Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron
Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 122, 299 A.2d 394, 400 (1973) (discovery rule applicable where plaintiff in good faith filed complaint against "John Doe" defendant and acted diligently in
amending upon discovery of the defendant's true name).
6362 N.J. at 271-72, 300 A.2d at 565.
64 Id. at 275-76, 300 A.2d at 568.
6,Id. at 276, 300 A.2d at 568. The court was careful to note, however, that these
criteria were not meant to be exclusive and that other relevant factors might be considered. Id. For example, certain additional factors which might be considered by a
court in such an analysis include the following: (1) the comparatively greater difficulty
in proving a wrong as opposed to the rebuttal of that proof; (2) a continuing doctorpatient relationship; and (3) the difficulty inherent in discovering certain types of injuries. Owens v. White, 342 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1965).
66 62 N.J. at 274, 300 A.2d at 567. The court noted that statutes of limitations are
principally designed to ensure fairness to the defendant by attempting to alleviate the
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cautioned that "not every belated discovery . . .justifqies] an appli-

cation of the [discovery] rule" and, therefore, the party seeking "the
' 67
indulgence of the rule" bears "the burden of proof."
The remaining issue in Lopez-whether the applicability of the
discovery rule is a question for the trial judge or the jury-was considered in the light of the equitable origins of the doctrine "as a
means of mitigating the often harsh and unjust results . . . [of] au-

tomatic adherence to a strict rule of law." 68 The court reasoned that
even though the determination of the time of discovery arguably
could be considered a fact question within the province of the jury,
the application of the rule entails an evaluation of the claims of each
party-a task acutely more demanding than a mere factual determination. 69 This factor, combined with the traditional allocation to the trial
court of the responsibility for determining the applicability of the statute of limitations, led to the conclusion that the trial judge is more suitably equipped to reach "a just accommodation" between claims which
"cannot be wholly reconciled." 70 As such, the question of the discovery
71
rule was held to be a matter for preliminary judicial interpretation.
In light of such recent interpretations of the discovery rule,
Judge Conford, writing for the majority in Fox, 72 initially proposed
that in administering the discovery rule simplicity and certainty
should be sought as long as consonant with principles of justice to
both parties. 73 Based upon this general premise, the majority reasoned that such considerations would best be effectuated by requiring
difficulties of adequately preparing a defense after a lapse of time. Id. For a more extensive treatment of these considerations, see notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text.
67 62 N.J. at 275-76, 300 A.2d at 567-68. Since the benefit of the rule was not granted
automatically, the Lopez court found it necessary, in each case in which discovery was
claimed, to weigh the competing interests of the parties. Id. at 274, 300 A.2d at 567.
Id. at 273-74, 300 A.2d at 566. Although the court noted that the issue of whether
the judge or the jury was to apply the discovery rule had not specifically been confronted in prior cases, previous courts had in fact submitted the question to the jury.
Lopez v. Swyer, 115 N.J. Super. 237, 252, 279 A.2d 116, 125 (App. Div. 1971), aff'd in
part and modified in part, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973).
69 See 62 N.J. at 274-75, 300 A.2d at 567.
70 Id. at 274, 300 A.2d at 567.
71Id. at 275, 300 A.2d at 567. In the federal system, however, the applicability of
the discovery rule is still a jury question. See, e.g., Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co.,
534 F.2d 566, 571-73 (3d Cir. 1976) (New Jersey rule allocating the application of the
discovery rule to the trial judge does not alter the federal practice of submitting the
issue to the jury), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 732 (1977). For a more detailed discussion of the
Goodman case, see note 101 infra.
72Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Sullivan and Pashman concurred with Judge
Conford in the majority. 71 N.J. at 132, 363 A.2d at 344.
73Id. at 125-26, 363 A.2d at 342-43.
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the trial judge to determine merely the date of the discovery of the
cause of action, without the additional burden of determining the
reasonableness of the time remaining within the two-year statutory period in which to institute suit. 74 Relying upon the underlying
premise of the discovery rule-that a cause of action accrues at the
time of discovery-the court concluded that, as a general rule, a
claimant is entitled to a full two years in which to institute suit following discovery. 7 5 In order to maintain the inherent protections afforded a defendant by the statute of limitations, 76 Judge Conford
qualified the holding by stating that the statute is a valid defense in a
discovery case when both of the following are shown: (1) the defendant
demonstrates unusual prejudice resulting from "the lapse of time between the expiration of two years after the . ..event and the .. .institution of the suit"; and (2) a "reasonable time" remained "to institute [the] action between discovery . . .and [the] expiration of [the]
two years after the actionable event. '77 Applying this criterion to the
facts of Fox, the court found that the requisite prejudice had not
been shown and the case was therefore remanded to the trial court
78
for a full trial on the merits.
In contrast to the majority, Justice Clifford, dissenting 79 maintained that while the majority solution is convenient as well as simple
and certain in application, both the considerations of equity and the
policy of the statute of limitations are sacrificed in the name of ef74Id. at

126, 363 A.2d at 343.
75Id. at 127, 363 A.2d at 343-44.
76 Id. at 127-28, 363 A.2d at 343-44. Relying on similar language in the Lopez case,
the court also acknowledged that the discovery rule necessarily dilutes the effect of the
statute of limitations and, as a result, has an "inherent capacity for prejudice to a defendant." Id. at 128, 363 A.2d at 344.
77Id. at 128, 363 A.2d at 344. In establishing this two-part prejudice rule, the court
relied on a similar analysis of the defendant's rights in a similar factual context in
Owens v, White, 342 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1965). 71 N.J. at 128, 363 A.2d at 344.
Initially, it was acknowledged by the Owens court that the discovery rule is limited
more strictly as the length of time from the negligent act increases. 342 F.2d at 820. As
a consequence of this analysis, the Owens court suggested that a suit, even by a diligent
plaintiff, can be "barred [by the statute of limitations] if the defendant shows undue
prejudice because of an extreme lapse of time between . . . the wrongful act and the
commencement of suit." Id.
78 71 N.J. at 128, 363 A.2d at 344. The appellate division had vacated the grant of
summary judgment for the defendant and remanded the case for trial. 135 N.J. Super. at
113, 342 A.2d at 862. This judgment was affirmed by the supreme court. 71 N.J. at 128,
363 A.2d at 344. For a more detailed analysis of the elements of a showing of prejudice,
see note 89 infra.
7971 N.J. at 128-32, 363 A.2d at 344-46. Justice Clifford was joined in his dissent by
Justices Mountain and Schreiber. Id. at 132, 363 A.2d at 346.
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ficiency. 8 ° Furthermore, the dissent noted that the majority, in apparent contrast to the origins of the rule as a means of preventing individual injustices, extended the rule to allow a full two years in which
to sue even in a situation in which adequate time remained to institute suit within two years of the act. 81 Echoing the sentiments of2
8
Judge Morgan's dissent to the decision of the appellate division,
Justice Clifford refused to ignore the concern for the diligent pursuit
of a claim underlying the statute of limitations in order to achieve a
rule uncomplicated in its application. 8 3 Moreover, since the trial
judge should be able to evaluate the " 'reasonableness' " of the time
remaining in which to commence an action with no more difficulty
than is entailed in weighing the equitable criteria of Lopez, the dissent concluded that the expeditious pursuit of a claim should be
given emphasis equal to the factor of prejudice in any application of
the discovery rule.84
80 Id. at 129, 363 A.2d at 344.

81 Id. Relying upon both Fernandi and Lopez, Justice Clifford contended that the
discovery rule originated as an equitable mechanism intended to mitigate the strict application of the statute of limitations when discovery was delayed until two years after
the actionable event. See id.
82 id. at 129-30, 363 A.2d at 345. Judge Morgan, in her appellate division dissent,
contended that since the plaintiff knew of the cause of action 19 months before instituting suit, the reasons for invoking the discovery rule did not exist. 135 N.J. Super. at
113-14, 342 A.2d at 862-63. Further, although a discovery late in the statutory period
should result in granting a reasonable extension of the statutory time, allowing a plaintiff
an automatic two years to file suit was not warranted. Id. at 116, 342 A.2d at 864. Judge
Morgan concluded that the majority holding would result in "encouraging dilatoriness"
and undermine certain of the policies underlying the statute of limitations. Id. at 117,
342 A.2d at 864.
83 71 N.J. at 132, 363 A.2d at 346. After noting that in an equitable application of the
discovery rule a plaintiff discovering the claim late in the statutory period would undoubtedly be afforded adequate time in which to commence an action, the dissent found
compelling reasons for requiring the diligent prosecution of a claim. Justice Clifford
pointed out that
[a] rule compelling prompt commencement of an action minimizes, as it should,
whatever gloss the judicial interpreti'e process brings to this legislative declaration whose intent, in the present context, is not entirely clear. At the same
time it keeps faith with the fundamental notion ... that litigants should pursue
their causes of action diligently.
Id. at 130, 132, 363 A.2d at 345-46.
8 Id.
at 130, 132, 363 A.2d 345-46. In contrast to the approach of the Fox majority,
which evaluates only whether suit is filed within two years of discovery, Justice Clifford noted that, under Lopez, the issue in a discovery case was whether or not the plaintiff was " 'equitably entitled to the benefit of the discovery rule.' " Id. (quoting from
Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. at 275, 300 A.2d at 567-68).
In Moran v. Napolitano, 71 N.J. 133, 142-44, 363 A.2d 346, 351-53 (1976), the companion case to Fox, Justice Clifford suggested that the discovery rule should be applied
if it is shown

19761

NOTES

Read in the context of the underlying principles of the statute of
limitations and the roots from which the doctrine developed, the Fox
case significantly changes the administration of the discovery rule in
New Jersey. The application of the discovery rule is now, in an appropriate case, automatically effective absent a showing of undue prejudice by a defendant. 8 5 As a result, rather than examining the
plaintiff's claim in light of the equitable criteria of Lopez, the discovery rule obtains if a belated discovery is established and the date of
filing suit is within two years of discovery. 86 Although the earlier cases
had "intimated" that the expeditious pursuit of a cause of action by a
claimant was required, under the majority holding in Fox, diligence is
no longer a relevant factor in evaluating the right of the plaintiff to the
benefit of the discovery rule. 87 Thus, the majority interprets the pol(a) that a plaintiff who discovers his cause of action after expiration of the statutory time limit has filed his complaint expeditiously, . . . or (h) that a plaintiff
who discovers his cause of action before the running of the two-years time limit
has instituted suit after that limit because the period remaining between discovery and expiration of the statute did not, under the particular circumstances,
constitute a reasonable time within which expeditiously to file his complaint ....
Id. at 142, 363 A.2d at 351-52 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
85 71 N.J. at 126, 363 A.2d at 343. The procedure for evaluating a discovery claim
prior to Fox was established in Lopez (discussed in depth at notes 61-71 supra and accompanying text).
m 71 N.J. at 126, 363 A.2d at 343. Since a cause of action does not accrue until discovery under Fernandi, the Fox court reasoned that "the legislative policy determination that" a suit may be instituted within two years of' accrual should inure to the benefit of the plaintiff. Id. By establishing a general rule of this type, the court sought to
reduce the attendant uncertainty of the application of the statute of limitations in discovery cases. Id.
An examination of Moran v. Napolitano, 71 N.J. 133, 363 A.2d 346 (1976), the companion case to Fox, further reveals the court's intent to establish an automatic rule.
Prior to extending the discovery rule to all cases of medical malpractice without reference to foreign objects, Judge Conford, writing for the majority in Moran, noted that in
view of the Fox decision the suit "was prima facie timely instituted, having been filed
within two years of . . . discovery." Id. at 137, 139, 363 A.2d at 348, 350 (emphasis in
original). For a more detailed discussion of Moran, see note 100 infra.
87 71 N.J. at 126, 363 A.2d at 343. Despite the contention by the majority that expeditiousness was only "intimated," id., an examination of the discovery cases preceding Fox reveals that in granting the equitable relief of the doctrine the courts had found
it necessary to evaluate the plaintiff's expeditious pursuit of the claim. For example, in
the Fernandi case, the court maintained that one of the "special considerations" allowing relief from the statute of limitations was the plaintiff's "expeditious institution of
legal action." 35 N.J. at 441-42, 173 A.2d at 281; accord, Farrell v. Votator Div. of
Chemetron Corp., 62 NJ. 111, 122, 299 A.2d 394, 400 (1973); Yerzy v. Levine, 108 N.J.
Super. at 229, 260 A.2d at 537.
Similarly, in other contexts where a disability of the plaintiff has been held to preclude strict application of the statute of limitations, the expeditious pursuit of the claim
has been required upon removal of the disability. For example, the court in Kyle v.
Green Acres at Verona, Inc., 44 N.J. 100, 207 A.2d 513 (1965), was confronted with the
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icy of the statute of limitations to mandate no greater diligence by a
party in these circumstances than would be necessary if the plaintiff
knew of the claim immediately.8 8 Nevertheless, it may be suggested
that, despite the majority's intention to remove the above factors from
consideration in a claim for the application of the discovery rule, the
prejudice requirement may, of necessity, involve taking into account
not only the plaintiff's expeditiousness in instituting suit but also certain factors enumerated in Lopez. 8 9
question of whether plaintiff's insanity would delay the running of the statute of limitations. Id. at 101, 207 A.2d at 513. In remanding the case, the court noted that if the
plaintiff's insanity was due to the act of the defendant, the statute of limitations should
not bar a claim if certain equitable criteria were met. Id. at 111-12, 207 A.2d at 519-20.
Furthermore, since diligence is required "because a plaintiff cannot defer the running of
the statute by sleeping on his rights," the defendant would be precluded from invoking
the statute of limitations if the plaintiff could establish that suit was instituted "within
a reasonable time after restoration of sanity," Id. at 112, 207 A.2d at 520.
8871 N.J. at 126, 363 A.2d at 343. In support of this conclusion, the Fox majority relied on several cases from other jurisdictions, in which a substantial amount of time
elapsed between discovery and the institution of suit. Id. at 127, 363 A.2d at 343. An
examination of the time sequences between discovery and the commencement of the
action in a sampling of those cases supports the court's conclusion. The following are
examples of the decisions referred to by the court in which discovery of the claim, as in
the Fox case, was within the original statutory time period dating from the act: Landis
v. Delp, 327 F. Supp. 766, 768 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (discovery eight months after act and
suit filed 20 months after discovery); Leech v. Bralliar, 275 F. Supp. 897, 901 (D. Ariz.
1967) (suit filed 23 months after discovery); Johnson v. Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230,
231-32. 526 P.2d 835, 836-37 (1974) (discovery of Penrose drains 16 months after operation and suit filed 23 months later).
Additionally, the court derived support for its analysis from several cases in which
discovery of the claim occurred after the expiration of the relevant time limitation dating
from the act, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 205, 208 (W.D. Ark. 1967)
(suit filed 13 months after discovery of claim which occurred 10 years after act); Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 50 Haw. 150, 151, 433 P.2d 220, 221 (discovery rule upheld although
negligent diagnosis was discovered twenty-six months after occurence and plaintiff delayed nearly two years in commencing action), rev'g on rehearing 50 Haw. 1, 427 P.2d
845 (1967); Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill.
2d 32, 33-35, 262 N.E.2d 450, 451-52
(1970) (discovery of cause of action three years after act and suit commenced nine months
later),
89 Although the court concluded that no adequate showing of prejudice had been
made by the defendant, it did not elaborate on those factors which would have constituted such a showing. It may be suggested, however, that certain of the factors outlined
in Lopez, namely, those relating to the availability of evidence and the plaintiff's intent
to delay, could form an appropriate basis for such a determination. See 62 N.J. at 276, 300
A.2d at 568. For a discussion of the Lopez criteria, see note 65 supra and accompanying text.
A similar analysis of possible considerations which may be useful in evaluating
prejudice was proposed in Owens v. White, 342 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1965). In Owens, the
court suggested that a suit might be barred by the statute of limitations if the defendant
were to show undue prejudice resulting from an "extreme lapse of time between the
commission of the wrongful act and the commencement of suit." Id. at 820. In evaluating
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If, in evaluating undue prejudice to a defendant, the criteria outlined in Lopez must necessarily be examined, then the shifting of the
burden of proof on this factor assumes added importance. Under
Lopez the trial judge, in ruling upon whether to apply the discovery
rule, was instructed to place the burden of proof, including the burden of showing the absence of prejudice to the defendant, on the
party claiming belated discovery of a cause of action. 90 The Fox decision, in contrast, mandates that the defendant be charged with making the requisite two-part showing of prejudice in order to preclude
the application of the discovery rule. 9 1
In further evaluating the ramifications of the Fox decision, it may
also be suggested that due to the origin of the doctrine as an equitable remedy, the construction of an automatic rule, contingent upon
the lack of prejudice, went further than necessary. 9 2 As suggested by
the dissent, an equitable application of the rule would not necessarily
result in unjustly barring a plaintiff whose discovery was so close to
the end of the statutory period as to render any possible resort to the
courts nugatory. 93 If this is so, establishing a rule automatic in appliprejudice, the Owens court suggested certain factors similar to those outlined in Lopez,
including "the relative difficulty of proving the wrong as contrasted with rebutting
that proof, . . . the availability of witnesses and records, the existence of a continuing relationship between doctor and patient, . . . and the inherent difficulty of discovering certain wrongs." Id. at 820 (footnotes omitted). The Owens court further suggests that this
method of evaluating cases would only be applicable if the "plaintiff is reasonably diligent." See id.
This point was further emphasized in Grey v. Silver Bow County, 149 Mont. 213,
425 P.2d 819 (1967), where the court noted that the discovery rule "should not be construed as an encouragement to future plaintiffs to delay filing of their actions if they can
be filed within the usual statute of limitations." Id. at 218, 425 P.2d at 821. The Grey
court then concluded that the doctrine can be applied fairly only if the requisite flexibility is maintained. Id.
Since the Fox court relied upon Lopez, Grey, and Owens as precedent for the components of the prejudice rule, it would appear that the decision does not achieve the
desired simplification of the rule's application. Rather, it only succeeds in shifting the
burden of advancing these same considerations to the party seeking to enforce the
statute of limitations.
90 62 N.J. at 276, 300 A.2d at 568. For an application of this principle, see Alfone v.
Sarno, 139 N.J. Super. 518, 524-25, 354 A.2d 654, 657-58 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 71
N.J. 498, 366 A.2d 654 (1976).
91 See 71 N.J. at 129 n1, 363 A.2d at 344 (Clifford, J., dissenting). It should be noted
that this allocation of the burden of showing prejudice to the defendant in order to invoke
the statute of limitations is consistent with the burden of pleading this defense under
New Jersey law. Compare id. with N.J.R. 4:5-4.
92 71 N.J. at 129, 363 A.2d at 344-45 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 130, 363 A.2d at 345. In such a situation, however, the dissent suggests that
it would be inappropriate to grant a party two full years after discovery to commence an
action. Id.
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cation may result in "encouraging dilatoriness" and could further
derogate the purposes of the limitation bar, 94 which are concededly
eroded by the discovery rule in any form. 95 Further, the establishment of a period of limitations is a recognized legislative function and
any judicial extension of the period can be considered an intrusion into
the legislative sphere. 96 Although the interests of justice mandate
judicial extension of the time period in certain cases, the courts should
94 Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 135 N.J. Super. at 116-17, 342 A.2d at 864 (Morgan, J.,
dissenting). In order to avoid these consequences, therefore, the court must evaluate
the expeditious pursuit of a claim by the plaintiff in administering the discovery rule.
Id. at 117, 342 A.2d at 864.
95 71 N.J. at 127-28, 363 A.2d at 343-44.
96 Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. at 452, 454, 173 A.2d at 287-88 (Hall, J., dissenting).
By applying the discovery rule, a court is weighing the policy of fairness to the defendant which underlies the statute of limitations, against the injustice that results when a
plaintiff, with no knowledge of the existence of a claim, is barred from suit. See Lopez
v. Swyer, 62 N.J. at 274, 300 A.2d at 566-67. Thus, by extending the period of jeopardy
beyond the original limitations period, the court is necessarily resolving those competing policies in favor of a particular party, despite the fact that the legislature, by its
enactment, has already chosen a means of resolving that precise conflict. See 35 N.J. at
452, 173 A.2d at 287 (Hall, J., dissenting). Since the enactment of the statute of limitations is purely a legislative function, the adoption of the discovery rule can thus be
considered "beyond the . . .bounds for judicial action" as this decision is based on the
premise that the legislative enactment is either "unwis[e] . .. or too stric[t] ...." Id.
at 454, 173 A.2d at 288. Although recognizing that the discovery rule is grounded upon
concepts of fairness, certain courts have refused to adopt the rule maintaining that
clarification of the statutory language or a modificaton in the statutory policy should be
left to the discretion of the legislature. See, e.g., Peterson v. Roloff, 57 Wis. 2d 1, 6-7,
203 N.W.2d 699, 702 (1973).
Moreover, certain other disabilities have been recognized to warrant delays in the
running of the limitations period and the legislature has incorporated these exceptions
into the statutory scheme. In New Jersey, for example, insanity, infancy, the nonresidence of the defendant, death, and the military service of a party are all statutorily
recognized exceptions to the strict running of the statute of limitations. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2A: 14-21 to -23, -26 (West 1952).
Yet another example of the legislative recognition of the injustice resulting from the
strict application of the limitations bar is reflected in the approach taken by the statute
of limitations relating to workman's compensation claims arising out of occupational diseases. In response to statute of limitations questions encompassing the contracting of
occupational diseases by employees over a period of time, the New Jersey legislature
has adopted a form of the discovery rule. Act of July 3, 1974, ch. 65, § 1, 1974 N.J. Laws
350 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-34 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-1977)). The pertinent statute provides that, although there is no general bar to the filing of claims, in those
cases in which "a claimant knew the nature of the disability and its relation to the employment, all claims for compensation .. .shall be barred unless a petition is filed ...
within 2 years after the date . . . claimant first had such knowledge." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:15-34 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-1977).
Thus, the existence of exceptions prescribed by the legislature further supports the
contention that the judiciary should refrain from carving out new exceptions. It can be
argued, that had the legislature intended any other exceptions, the statutes would have
so provided. See 35 N.J. at 454, 173 A.2d at 287-88 (Hall, J., dissenting).
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not go so far as to "substitut[e] one court-created period of limitations
97
for the normal statutory one."
Additionally, it still remains unclear whether the rule in Fox is
applicable if discovery of the claim occurs after the expiration of a
two-year period following the actionable conduct. 9 8 In this regard,
the court does note that, at least in evaluating the prejudice inhering
to a defendant in this situation, other factors would have to be considered and, a fortiori, the considerations outlined in Lopez would
have additional force in such a determination. 99
Left unresolved by the Fox decision are several issues involved
in the application of the discovery rule. 10 0 For example, several of
97 Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 135 N.J. Super. at 114, 342 A.2d at 863 (Morgan, J.,
dissenting); see 71 N.J. at 129, 363 A.2d at 344 (Clifford, J., dissenting). As Judge Morgan stated, in applying the discovery rule in this manner, the court is "extend[ing] the
benefits of the rule beyond the necessity for its creation." 135 N.J. Super. at 114-15, 342
A.2d at 863.
98 71 N.J. at 128 n.2, 363 A.2d at 344. The court explicitly reserved decision on the
question of the application of the discovery rule when discovery occurs more than two
years after the actionable conduct. Id.
99 See id. Since the announced prejudice rule is applicable only when discovery is
within two years of the act, the court suggested that the equitable considerations outlined in Lopez might be relevant when discovery occurs at a later date. For a detailed
examination of the factors discussed in Lopez, see text accompanying note 65 supra.
Thus, it may be suggested that by applying other factors, the court implicitly acknowledges that as the length of time from the act increases, the appeal of the plaintiff to the
equitable relief of the discovery rule becomes less insistent and the application of the
doctrine may in fact be limited. See Owens v. White, 342 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1965).
10 Although the Fox decision did not consider the question of the extent to which
the original limitation of the discovery rule to foreign object malpractice cases had been
abrogated, the companion case of Moran v. Napolitano, 71 N.J. 133, 139, 363 A.2d 346,
350 (1976), expands the scope of the doctrine in this regard. In Moran, the plaintiff
alleged that her physicians had negligently diagnosed and treated her condition, the
result of which remained undiscovered until several months later. Id. at 135, 363 A.2d
at 347-48. The trial court concluded that the belated discovery tolled the statute of
limitations and thus the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment on
this ground. See id. at 135-36, 363 A.2d at 348. The appellate division, in an unreported
opinion, affirmed, concluding that since the claim was filed within two years of' discovery the denial of summary judgment was proper and any equitable preclusion of the
rule was more properly asserted at the trial stage. See id. at 136, 363 A.2d at 348.
On appeal, the supreme court initially noted that, in conformity with the Fox decision, the claim was timely asserted since it had been filed within two years of discovery. Id. at 137, 363 A.2d at 348-49. In considering the defendant's contention that the
discovery rule was applicable only to foreign object or analogous cases under Fernandi,
the court maintained that such limitations on the doctrine had been rejected by subsequent cases, including the Lopez decision. Id. at 137-39, 363 A.2d at 349-50. Relying
upon Lopez, as well as a growing trend in other jurisdictions, the court concluded that
the discovery rule should be applied to all aspects of medical malpractice whenever
" 'equity and justice' " demanded it. Id. (quoting from Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. at 273,
300 A.2d at 566). The court further found that no relevant distinction obtained between
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the procedural and evidentiary methods for evaluating a claim involving the doctrine remain unchanged. 10 1 Additionally, although the
method of applying the discovery rule in the context of longer statutory periods of limitation is not determined in the Fox case, 10 2 it
should be noted that the statutory time for commencing actions not
03
involving personal injuries extends much longer than two years.1
Even though the considerations of fairness to the defendant may be
more insistent in these instances, past decisions in this context sugthe hardship and injustice of denying judicial relief to a plaintiff ignorant of his claim in
a foreign object case as opposed to a case based on an alleged misdiagnosis. 71 N.J. at
140, 363 A.2d at 350.
Although Justice Clifford agreed with the majority's analysis of the foreign object
question, he dissented from the holding which allowed two years after discovery in
which to institute suit, based on the same reasoning he relied upon in the Fox case. Id.
at 142-44, 363 A.2d at 351-53. For a detailed discussion of the dissent in Fox, see notes
79-84 supra and accompanying text.
101 In Fox, the court explicitly states that the plaintiff is charged with establishing
the date of his discovery. 71 N.J. at 128 n.1, 363 A.2d at 344. Furthermore, the principle
that the trial judge is charged with applying the discovery rule, established in Lopez,
remains unchanged. See 62 N.J. at 274-75, 300 A.2d at 567; notes 73-75 supra and
accompanying text.
The allocation of the responsibility to the trial judge, however, does not apply in
the Third Circuit. See Goodman v. mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 732 (1977). In Goodman, a diversity claim was instituted
by a husband, on behalf of his wife, against the manufacturer of a birth control drug. Id.
at 568-69. In reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment based upon the
expiration of the New Jersey statute of limitations, the court first reviewed the discovery rule as outlined in Lopez case. Id. at 570-71. However, in the court's analysis, that
decision was not dispositive of the respective roles of the judge and jury in a federal diversity action. Id. at 571. Judge Gibbons noted that the allocation of the decision as to
whether to apply the discovery rule to the trial judge in New Jersey was based upon
"competing state policies." Id. at 572. It was concluded, however, that the policy of the
federal courts of submitting "disputed fact questions" to the jury takes precedence over
the state rule. Id. at 573. In reaching this decision, the court relied chiefly on the decision in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535, 538 (1958) (federal
policy favoring submitting disputed case to jury not disturbed by state allocation of fact
question to judge under state workman's compensation statute).
102 71 N.J. at 128 n.3, 363 A.2d at 344.
103 For example, the statute of limitations for contractual liability in New Jersey extends for six years. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1 (West 1952). Additionally, the statutory time for certain actions involving real property extends for a ten-year period of
time. Id. § 2A:14-1.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-1977).
Furthermore, certain statutory enactments present notice and limitations questions
which are amenable to the application of the discovery rule. See, e.g., Torres v. Jersey
City Medical Center, 140 N.J. Super. 323, 327, 356 A.2d at 75, 77 (Law Div. 1976)
(discovery rule applicable to late notice provisions of New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 59:8-8 to -9 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-1977)); cf. Montag v. Bergen Bluestone Co., 145 N.J. Super. 140, 145-46, 149-50, 366 A.2d 1361, 1363-64, 1366 (Law Div.
1976) (discovery rule applicable to $200 injury threshold for actionable claim under
New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8 (West 1973)).
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gest that the approach of the Fox court may be adopted. 10 4
Although the thrust of the Fox decision is to reduce the uncertainty attendant to the application of the discovery rule, inherent
considerations of fairness to the defendant may limit the achievement
of this goal. In particular, since the evaluation of prejudice to the
defendant is acknowledged by the court as a concomitant to allowing
a plaintiff two years in which to institute suit following actual or constructive discovery, many of the complex considerations which the
Fox court attempted to eliminate have only been shifted to the defendant. It may be suggested, however, that the application of the
statute of limitations in the medical malpractice context, presenting
such disparate factual situations, warrants separate statutory treatment. Ultimately, a legislative solution to the competing interests involved is preferable to judicial resolution on a case-by-case basis.
Charles Anthony Strenk
104 See, e.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. Hausler, 108 N.J. Super. 421, 261 A.2d 671 (App.
Div. 1970), in which the insurer of a stockbroker had filed an action in July 1968 to
recover damages for the alleged wrongful detention of a stock certificate, misdelivered
to a purchaser in February 1961, Id. at 423, 261 A.2d at 672-73. The trial court granted
summary judgment on the basis of the expiration of the applicable six-year statute of
limitations despite the defendant's contention that discovery of the error was not made
until November 1962. Id., 261 A.2d at 672. In remanding the case for trial, the court
noted that the fact that discovery was made prior to the expiration of the original six
years was irrelevant and that the critical question to be determined was whether the
date of discovery was within six years of the filing of suit. Id. at 426, 261 A.2d at 674.
The court concluded that in light of the financial benefits and the factual knowledge
attributable to the defendants together with the uncertainty as to the date of discovery
of the error, this situation was an appropriate one for the extension of the discovery
rule. Id.

